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ABSTRACT
Despite Basel III’s  efforts to address capital and liquidity requirements, will  the risks  linked to 
regulatory arbitrage increase as a result of Basel III’s more stringent capital and liquidity rules?
As  well as Basel III  reforms which are geared towards greater facilitation of financial stability on a 
macro prudential basis, further efforts and initiatives aimed at mitigating systemic risks –  hence 
fostering financial stability, have been promulgated through the establishment of the De Larosiere 
Group, the European Systemic Risk Board, and a working group comprising of “international standard 
setters and authorities responsible for the translation of G20 commitments into standards.”
This paper aims to investigate the impact of Basel III  on shadow banking and its facilitation of 
regulatory arbitrage as well as consider the response of various jurisdictions and standard setting 
bodies to aims and initiatives aimed at improving their macro prudential frameworks. Furthermore, it 
will also aim to illustrate why immense work is still required at European level –  as regards efforts to 
address systemic risks on a macro prudential basis. This being the case even though significant efforts 
and steps have been taken to address the macro prudential framework. In so doing, the paper will also 
attempt to address how coordination within the macro prudential framework –  as well as between 
micro and macro prudential supervision could be enhanced. 
Key Words:  counter party risks, liquidity, European Systemic Risk Board, stability, systemic risk, 
shadow banking, central  banks, regulatory  arbitrage, OTC  derivatives, European Central  Bank, 
supervision, coordination
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A. Introduction
Recent Efforts Aimed at Fostering Financial Stability
The establishment of the De Larosiere Group was announced by the Commission in a move aimed at 
“considering the organization of European financial institutions to ensure prudential soundness, the 
orderly functioning of markets and stronger European cooperation on financial stability oversight, 
early warning mechanisms and crisis management (including the management of cross border and 
cross sectoral risks), as well as looking at cooperation between the European Union and other major 
jurisdictions to help safeguard financial stability at the global level.”2 Other more recent moves aimed 
at fostering macro financial stability as well as “contributing directly to achieving the objectives of the 
Internal Market”, include the establishment of the European Systemic Risk  Board (ESRB)  and a 
working  group3 comprised  of  international  standard  setters  and authorities  responsible  for  the 
translation of G20 commitments into standards. Purpose of the establishment of the Working Group 
being  to  make  recommendations  on  the  implementation  of  objectives4 aimed  at  “improving 
transparency in  the derivatives markets, mitigating systemic risk, and protecting  against market 
abuse.” The establishment of the De Larosiere Group, the ESRB  and the Working Group not only 
highlights the importance attached to aims directed at fostering and promoting financial stability, but 
also the paramount importance attached to the need to manage systemic risks –  as well as the need to 
regulate the OTC (Over - the- Counter) derivatives markets. 
1 Lessing Trebing Bert Rechtsanwälte, Frankfurt and Oxford Brookes University, Oxford. Email: 
marianneojo@hotmail.com
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 See Commission Communication, “From Financial Crisis to Recovery: A European Framework for 
Action” COM (2008) 706 final 29 October 2008 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=COM:2008:0706:FIN:EN:PDF>
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 Working group was led by representatives of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
(CPSS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the European Commission. The 
Working Group’s focus was also directed at “common approaches to OTC  derivatives markets to achieve 
consistency in implementation across jurisdictions whilst promoting greater use of OTC derivatives products in 
standardised form and the minimization of possibilities for regulatory arbitrage.” See  Financial Stability Board, 
“Implementing  OTC  Derivatives  Market  Reforms”  Oct  2010 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf> at page 3
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 G20 objectives
Hence the paper will commence with a section dedicated to the contribution of the OTC derivatives 
markets to financial instability –  as well as measures which have been proposed and implemented in 
the attempt and challenge to manage different types of risks which exist within the banking and 
investment sectors –  particularly, counterparty and liquidity risks. Section C  of the paper will then 
consider why there has been increased focus in the significance attached to the roles of central banks 
in  crisis  management, financial  stability  and  the supervisory  coordination  process.  Section  D 
elaborates on the factors which have prompted the need for a reform of macro prudential supervision 
at European level. This will be followed by a section (section E)   which highlights the need for 
improved coordination between micro and macro prudential aspects of financial supervision –  as well 
as incorporates discussions  on the ECB’s  macro prudential expertise, the involvement of micro 
prudential supervisors and a member of the Commission in the work of the ESRB. It will also consider 
recent efforts aimed at addressing systemic risks at macro prudential level by primarily focusing on the 
European Systemic Risk Board. Reason for such a focus being an insufficient emphasis on macro 
prudential oversight and inter linkages –  with respect to the present arrangements of the European 
Union. To facilitate an analysis of the efforts which will and may still be required, reference will be 
made to other macro prudential frameworks. Furthermore, present efforts to incorporate the European 
Central Bank (ECB)’s expertise, as well as those of national central banks, European Supervisory 
Authorities, the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) will be considered.
The significance of shadow banking - as well as the channels through which shadow banking activities 
are carried out, will then be introduced under Section F. This will be followed by a section dedicated to 
a consideration of efforts aimed at addressing regulatory arbitrage before a conclusion is derived.
B. Financial Stability
“In  order to ensure financial  stability, the Commission should review and report on measures to enhance the 
transparency of OTC markets, to mitigate the counterparty risks and more generally to reduce the overall risks, such as 
by clearing of credit default swaps through central counterparties (CCPs). The establishment and development of 
CCPs in the EU subject to high operational and prudential standards and effective supervision should be encouraged. 
The Commission should submit its report to the European Parliament and the Council together with any appropriate 
proposals, taking into account parallel initiatives at the global level as appropriate.”5
I. Principal Contributory Factors to Financial Instability
Weaknesses in OTC  derivatives markets that had contributed to the build-up of systemic risk, as 
revealed during the recent Crisis included:6 “the build-up of large counterparty exposures between 
5
5
 See DIRECTIVE 2009/111/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 
16 September 2009 amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to 
central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management 
at  page 5 of 23
6
particular market participants which were not appropriately risk-managed; and contagion risk arising 
from the web of interconnectedness of market participants created by bilateral clearing of OTC 
derivatives products; and the limited transparency of overall counterparty credit risk exposures.” 
Counterparty Risks
Counterparty risks constitute the most significant of risks which exist within the financial markets –  
owing to their nature, magnitude, as well as the extent to which such risks are regulated. 
As   part of efforts aimed at mitigating counterparty credit risk –  which constitutes  a fundamental 
component of systemic risk  in OTC  derivative markets, it was agreed by G-20 leaders that all 
standardized derivatives should be cleared through central counterparties latest by the end of 2010.7 
From this the importance of the central clearing channel as a means of mitigating systemic risks can be 
inferred. Non centrally cleared contracts are to be subjected to:  i) higher capital requirements to 
reflect their risk levels;   ii) more consolidated bilateral counterparty risk management requirements.8 
Despite the stated advantages attributed to central and standardized clearing procedures, legal and 
operational  standardization is  considered to impose structures  and limitations  on the economic 
function of a derivatives product –  hence the reason why market participants seeking to hedge a 
specific risk may not find a standardized product that would effectively suit their exposure and hence 
opt instead, to use a bespoke product.9
Credit counterparty risks (CCR) exist within credit institutions –  as well as emanate from investment 
institutions. Institutions are required to hold capital against counterparty credit risks arising from 
exposures attributed to OTC  derivative instruments and credit derivatives; repurchase agreements, 
reverse repurchase agreements, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions based on 
securities  or  commodities  included in  the trading  book; margin  lending  transactions  based on 
 
 Bespoke products may be particularly susceptible to these weaknesses, as evidenced by market 
participants’ failure to appropriately risk manage a number of bespoke credit derivatives products. The G-20 
commitments aim to mitigate the systemic risk of bespoke products in the future by increasing standardisation 
and transparency. See Financial Stability Board, “Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms” Oct 2010 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf> at page 19. For further reasons attributed to 
the preference of bespoke products, see pages 19-21
7
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 See ibid at page 23
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 Ibid; Furthermore, as a means of increasing the incentives to implement central clearing procedures, 
mandatory clearing guidelines are to be stipulated for non centrally cleared contracts.
9
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 Even though bespoke OTC  derivatives often do not have the level of standardization required for 
central clearing or trading on organized platforms –  since they are customized to meet particular user needs. See 
ibid at page 19
securities or commodities; and long settlement transactions.10 As well as credit risks, other significant 
types of risks which exist within credit institutions are as follows:11
Liquidity  risks, market risks, legal  risks, operational  risks12, residual  risks13, concentration risk, 
securitisation risk and interest rate risks arising from non trading activities.
Risks attributed to investment institutions include14 market risks, counterparty/settlement risks, foreign 
exchange risks, interest rate risks and operational risks.
Whilst it is argued that OTC derivatives benefit financial markets, as well as the wider economy by 
“improving the pricing of risk, adding to liquidity, helping market participants manage their respective 
risks”15, flaws inherent in the structure of such derivatives –  “the potential for contagion arising from 
the interconnectedness  of  OTC  derivatives  market participants and the limited transparency  of 
counterparty relationships,”16 were also revealed during the recent Crisis. 
10
1
 DIRECTIVE 2006/49/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14 June 
2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast) at page 32 of 55.
11
 See Annex V, Technical Criteria Concerning the Organisation and Treatment of Risks DIRECTIVE 
2006/48/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14 June 2006 relating to the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) at pages 79-80 of 200.
12
 “Operational risks are significant risks faced by institutions and require coverage by own funds. It is of 
vital essence to take into account the diversity of institutions in the EU –  through the provision of alternative 
approaches.” See paragraph 25, DIRECTIVE 2006/49/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of  14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast)
page 2 
13
 “The risk that recognized credit risk mitigation techniques used by a credit institution will prove less 
effective than expected.”
14
 See DIRECTIVE 2006/49/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of  14 
June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast) at page 2
15
 Financial  Stability  Board,  “Implementing  OTC  Derivatives  Market  Reforms”  Oct  2010 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf>at page 1
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Two principal contributory factors to financial instability (at macro level) which are in need of urgent 
redress are liquidity risks and counter party credit risks.  Even though risks have been classified under 
Directives  2006/48/EC  and 2006/49/EC  according  to whether they  are attributed to credit or 
investment institutions,  paragraph  11  of  the  DIRECTIVE  2006/49/EC  OF  THE  EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND  OF THE COUNCIL of 14 June 2006 highlights the fact that investment firms 
face the same risks as credit institutions in their trading book business.17 
Whilst it is difficult to assign an order of priority between liquidity and counterparty credit risks, 
liquidity  risks  could  be considered to have a marginally  higher ranked order of  priority  than 
counterparty credit risks.
According to paragraph 30 of the Preamble to the DIRECTIVE  2009/111/EC OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 September 2009,18 “recent market developments have 
highlighted the fact that liquidity risk management is a key determinant of the soundness of credit 
institutions and their branches.”
II. Harmonisation as a Vital Tool in the Facilitation of Effective Coordination and Supervision
A  harmonized set of standards or rules is essential to the facilitation of effective coordination and 
supervision. “Liquidity supervision at the level of a branch in another Member State,” according to the 
Commission Services, will not be necessary anymore –  owing to a harmonized liquidity standard and 
the progress that has been achieved by the Reorganization and Winding up Directive of 2001.
In relation to supervisory arrangements which are aimed at achieving a harmonized set of rules, and 
with particular respect to liquidity standards, recital 7 of Directive 2006/48/EC  states that “it is 
appropriate to effect only the essential harmonization necessary and sufficient to secure the mutual 
recognition of authorization and of prudential supervision systems.”
In  respect  of  credit  institutions  with  significant  branches  in  another  Member  State, liquidity 
supervision  could  be considered to be the responsibility  of  the home Member State in  close 
collaboration with the host Member States “if a harmonized set of liquidity rules is in place”.19  
 
 ibid
17
1
 (L 177/202 Official Journal of the European Union, on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit 
institutions (recast)
Paragraph 11 states that “ Since investment firms face in respect of their trading book business the same 
risks as credit institutions, it is appropriate for the pertinent provisions of Directive 2006/ 48/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions (1) to apply equally to investment firms.”
18
 amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to central 
institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management. See 
page 4 of 23.
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Paragraph 25 of the Commission Services Staff Working Document20 makes reference to Article 41, 
first  sub  paragraph  of  Directive  2006/48/EC  which  provides  that host Member  States  “retain 
responsibility for the supervision of liquidity of branches of EU credit institutions, but only pending 
further coordination.” Furthermore, “if  continued coordination is  achieved by  setting  uniform 
liquidity standards in the EU, this subparagraph could be deleted, and supervisory arrangements for 
liquidity would no longer be different from those for solvency supervision.” This, according to 
paragraph  25,  would  suffice  for  the liquidity  standard  to  achieve  the standard  of  “essential 
harmonization” referred to under recital 7 of Directive 2006/48/EC.
A  harmonized  liquidity  standard  is  certainly  very  helpful  in  contributing  to  consistency  and 
coordination –  however it should be used as a general benchmark –  which can be deviated from (to a 
minimal extent) in justified exceptional cases and depending on individual circumstances of the 
Member States involved. Where such Member States’ liquidity standards significantly differ from such 
a benchmark, then these Member States’ liquidity standards should not be applied. 
Several stages were identified by the Commission in its Communication21 as phases through which the 
route from financial instability to financial stability are to be achieved. These are as follows:
i) Stabilisation of the Crisis
ii) Restructuring the banking sector
iii) Hand-over of banks to the private sector at some stage in the future 
Furthermore, continued strong support for the financial system from the European Central Bank and 
other central banks; a rapid and consistent implementation of the bank rescue plans established by 
Member States; as well as decisive measures required to mitigate the spread of the Crisis across 
Member States22 were also highlighted as vital routes which had to be taken if the path to recovery was 
to be successful. The following section considers the role of central banks and the European Central 
Bank in the above mentioned phases, as well as in the process of ensuring that effective coordination 
of supervisory arrangements is achieved. 
o
 See paragraph 28, Commission Services Staff Working Document, “Possible Further Changes to the 
Capital Requirements Directive : Supervisory Responsibility for Branch Liquidity” at page 13 of 99
20
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 On “Possible Further Changes to the Capital Requirements Directive”; ibid at page 12 of 99
21
 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission_ From Financial Crisis to 
Recovery: A European Framework for Action at page 3 29.10.2008 COM (2008) 706 final < http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0706:FIN:EN:PDF>
22
 See ibid
C. The Increased Importance and Roles of Central Banks in Crisis Management, Financial 
Stability and the Supervisory Coordination Process.
Directive 2009/111/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009
The importance of incorporating central banks into the supervisory process –  given their vital roles as 
lenders of last resort facilities and crucial providers of liquidity support, as well as the importance of 
improved coordination in emergency situations is highlighted in the Directive 2009/111/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009.23
Paragraph 6 of the Preamble states that “for the purpose of strengthening the crisis management 
framework of the Community, it is essential that competent authorities coordinate their actions with 
other competent authorities and, where appropriate, with central banks in an efficient way, including 
with the aim of mitigating systemic risk.” With respect to consolidated supervision, the importance of 
establishing Colleges of Supervisors is also emphasized.
According to Article 129 paragraph 1 of Directive 2006/48/EC:
1. In addition to the obligations imposed by the provisions of this Directive, the competent authority 
responsible for the exercise of supervision on a consolidated basis of EU parent credit institutions and 
credit institutions controlled by EU  parent financial holding companies shall carry out the following 
tasks:
(a) coordination of the gathering and dissemination of relevant or essential information in going concern and 
emergency situations; and
(b) planning and coordination of supervisory activities in going concern as well as in emergency situations, 
including in relation to the activities in Article 124, in cooperation with the competent authorities involved.
Amendments by Directive 2009/111/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009
Article 129 (as amended by Directive 2009/111/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 September 2009) is amended as follows:
Amendment 1
Paragraph 1 point (b)
(formally:
(b) planning and coordination of supervisory activities in going concern as well as in emergency situations, 
including in relation to the activities in Article 124, in cooperation with the competent authorities involved.
 is replaced by the following:
23
2
 Amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to 
central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis 
management.
(b)planning and coordination of supervisory activities in going-concern situations, including in relation to the activities 
referred to in Articles 123, 124, 136,in Chapter 5 and in Annex V,  in cooperation with the competent authorities 
involved;
c) planning and coordination of supervisory activities in cooperation with the competent authorities involved, and if 
necessary with central banks, in preparation for and during emergency situations, including adverse developments in 
credit institutions or in financial markets using, where possible, existing defined channels of communication for 
facilitating crisis management.
The planning and coordination of supervisory activities referred to in point (c) includes exceptional measures referred 
to  in  Article 132(3)(b),  the preparation  of  joint  assessments,  the  implementation  of  contingency  plans  and 
communication to the public.’;
Amendment 2
Furthermore, the following paragraph is added to Article 129 (as paragraph 3) 
Paragraph 3:
The consolidating supervisor and the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of subsidiaries of an EU 
parent credit institution or an EU parent financial holding company in a Member State shall do everything within their 
power to reach a joint decision on the application of  Articles 123 and 124  to determine the adequacy of the 
consolidated level of own funds held by the group with respect to its financial situation and risk profile and the 
required level of own funds for the application of Article 136(2) to each entity within the banking group and on a 
consolidated basis.
The joint decision shall be reached within four months after submission by the consolidating supervisor of a report 
containing the risk assessment of the group in accordance with Articles 123 and 124 to the other relevant competent 
authorities. The joint decision shall also duly consider the risk assessment of subsidiaries performed by relevant 
competent authorities in accordance with Articles 123 and 124. 
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors shall elaborate guidelines for the convergence of supervisory 
practices with regard to the joint decision process referred to in this paragraph and with regard to the application of 
Articles 123, 124 and 136(2) with a view to facilitating joint decisions.’;
According to paragraph 9 of the Preamble to the Directive 2009/111/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 September 2009 (amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated 
to  central  institutions, certain  own funds  items, large exposures, supervisory  arrangements, and  crisis 
management),
Article 129(3) of Directive 2006/48/EC “should not change the allocation of responsibilities between competent 
supervisory authorities on a consolidated, sub-consolidated and individual basis.”
However, the subsequent paragraph, paragraph 10  acknowledges what role information deficits 
between the home and the host competent authorities could play –  as well as the detrimental nature of 
such deficits to the financial stability in host Member States. As a result, paragraph 10 of the Preamble 
stipulates that “the information rights of host supervisors, in particular in a crisis involving significant 
branches, should be reinforced.” Furthermore, it adds that the notion of significant branches should be 
defined and that competent authorities  should  transmit information  which  is  essential  for  the 
pursuance of the tasks of central banks and Ministries of Finance with respect to financial crises and 
systemic risk mitigation.
With respect to the role of central banks in situations involving crisis management and resolution, the 
role to be assumed by the European Central Bank (with respect to the EU macro prudential oversight 
framework), will be of interest, given that “the ESRB does not have explicit tasks and powers on crisis 
management –  apart from the power to advise the council  on the existence of  an emergency 
situation.”24 With respect to other macro prudential oversight arrangements, the Federal Reserve and 
the Bank of England, by virtue of their expertise and the positions they assume as central banks, are 
capable of responding in crisis situations –  as liquidity providers and lenders of last resort.  The ECB, 
24
with its capacity to engage central banks of Member States, as well as its expertise should definitely be 
involved (to a large extent) in crisis management situations. The new system of European supervision, 
as well as the ECB’s expertise are amongst some of the topics which will be considered in the next 
section.
D. The Need for a New System of Supervision at European Level
Coordination or rather, the lack of coordination between different levels of supervision in the Union 
has  been acknowledged has  having  contributed to the need for  a new system for  European 
Supervision. As well as facilitating early warning signals, a well coordinated system of supervision is 
crucial to ensuring that information is promptly transmitted across the relevant channels to its target. A  
fragmented system of supervision, the need for consistency in the application of rules across member 
states (harmonization) and the need for a mechanism in resolving agreements and taking action in 
emergency situations are all areas which were acknowledged to be in need of redress. Furthermore, 
lack of adequate mechanism for macro prudential supervision, lack of early warning mechanisms, as 
well as lack of resources for the level 3 Committees [the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS), the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee (CEIOPS) and 
the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)], were also contributory to the need for a 
new system of financial supervision.
Several serious flaws which provide justification for the need for a revised system of financial 
supervision in the EU –  and particularly, the need for the new European Supervisory Authorities were 
identified in the report of the De Larosiere Group.  The new authorities, the European Supervisory 
Authorities, are to consolidate on the Lamfalussy level 3 Committees [the Committee of European 
Banking  Supervisors  (CEBS), the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Committee (CEIOPS)  and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)]. The new 
supervisory authorities comprise the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) 
established by Regulation (EU)  No 1093/2010;  the European Supervisory  Authority (European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010; the 
European  Supervisory  Authority  (European  Securities  and  Markets  Authority)  established  by 
Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
1
 “With respect to the EU  framework, the ECB  has a key role in providing analytical and statistical 
support to the ESRB. However, macro prudential oversight is not integrated with micro prudential supervision 
within the EU framework –  given the fact that supervision will continue to be carried out principally by national 
supervisory authorities –  with the European Supervisory Authorities having a mainly coordinating role.” For 
further information on this, refer to the second table of the Annex to this paper and see also, European Central 
Bank, Financial Stability Review December 2010 at pages 60 and 61.
I I. The Need for Improved Coordination between National Supervisors
It is acknowledged that although a single market exists, as well as the operation of cross border 
financial institutions, several problems warranted the creation of the new European Supervisory 
Authorities:25 
- The existence of an uneven and often uncoordinated system of supervision.
- The need for convergence between member states on technical rules
- The need for  a mechanism for  ensuring  agreement and coordination  between national 
supervisors of the same cross border institution or in colleges of supervisors.
- Rapid and effective mechanism to ensure consistent application of rules
- Coordinated decision making in some areas in emergency situations.
With respect to the need for harmonization,
- “ the lack of a mechanism to resolve the situation whereby an agreement cannot be reached 
and cooperation is  required between national  supervisors  of  cross  border groups(within 
colleges of supervisors);
- The  fact  that many  technical  rules  are  determined  at member  state level  and  given 
considerable differences between member states,26
were highlighted as being crucial in propagating the realization of the need for technical standards. 
Further, a fragmented system of supervision, it is added, “undermines the single market, imposes extra 
costs for financial institutions, and increases the likelihood of failure of financial institutions with 
potentially additional costs for tax payers.”27
Since macro prudential oversight is not integrated with micro prudential supervision in the European 
wide framework, and given the fact that supervision will continue to be carried out primarily by 
25
2
 See Europa Press Releases, “European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS): Why are New 
European Supervisory Authorities Needed?” <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=MEMO/09/404>
26
 See ibid
27
 ibid
national  supervisory  authorities,28effective coordination and timely  communication –  as  well  as 
harmonization are required to assume immensely crucial roles if the objectives of the framework are to 
be realized.
E. The Need for Improved Coordination between Micro and Macro Prudential Aspects of 
Financial Supervision
In drawing attention to particular areas, paragraph 11 of the Preamble to the Regulation29 on European 
Union Macro-prudential Oversight of the Financial System and Establishing a European Systemic 
Risk  Board acknowledges the need for greater efforts in  initiatives  aimed at improving  macro 
prudential oversight. The areas are as follows:30
- The present arrangements of the European Union –  which place insufficient emphasis on 
macro-prudential  oversight  and  inter  linkages  between  developments  in  the  broader 
macroeconomic environment and the financial system.
- Responsibility for macro prudential analysis being fragmented and conducted by different 
authorities at corresponding levels
- Lack of mechanism to ensure that macro prudential risks are adequately identified and that 
warnings and recommendations are issued clearly, followed up and translated into action
- The need for enhanced consistency between macro and micro prudential supervision –  to 
ensure proper functioning of the European Union and global financial systems, as well as the 
mitigation of threats.
In response to the first identified area, the importance of effective coordination between micro and 
macro prudential supervision within the financial system as well as the symbiotic relationship between 
macro and micro prudential supervision is further highlighted by way of reference to the De Larosiere 
Report:31
28
2
 See European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review December 2010 at page 60
29
 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010;  L 331/1 15.12.2010, Official Journal of the European Union 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0001:0011:EN:PDF>
30
3
 See ibid
31
 See ibid at paragraph 13 (Preamble to the Regulation); page 3 of 11
“The De Larosiere Report also states that macro-prudential oversight is not meaningful unless it can 
somehow impact at micro level whilst micro prudential supervision cannot effectively safeguard 
financial stability without adequately taking account of macro developments.”
In drawing a comparison between macro prudential frameworks which exist at EU level, as well as 
that which exists in the US and the UK, the following observations can be made:32
- Even though the prominent role assumed by the European Central Bank as a “provider of 
analytical and statistical support to the European Systemic Risk Board” is highlighted (as well 
as the prominent roles assumed by central banks in the UK  and the US), the absence of a 
“macro prudential oversight which is integrated with micro prudential supervision” in the EU 
macro prudential framework is a factor which distinguishes it from other frameworks in the 
analysis.
Given the role of national central banks as guardians of financial stability, the ECB’s leading role for 
macro prudential oversight would also require an incorporation of the roles of national central banks –  
given the expertise and knowledge base of these central banks. Harmonized standards should facilitate 
the tasks of the European Central Bank –  particularly in situations where supervision at the level of a 
branch in another Member State will  no longer be required –  for example, as is  the case with 
harmonized liquidity standards.33
The ECB’s Macro Prudential Expertise
The ECB’s expertise in matters related to macro prudential issues, its potential to make “significant 
contribution to the effective macro prudential oversight of the Union’s financial system” is highlighted 
under Paragraph 7 of the Council Regulation (EU)  No  1096/2010.34 Furthermore, the ECB  is  to 
“ensure” that the Secretariat of the ESRB, as well as sufficient human and financial resources is 
32
3
 See European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review December 2010 < 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview201012en.pdf> at page 60
33
 See paragraph 25, Commission Services Staff Working Document, “Possible Further Changes to the 
Capital Requirements Directive : Supervisory Responsibility for Branch Liquidity” at page 12 of 99
34
 Of 17 November 2010: Conferring specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning the 
functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board. See particularly page 1, paragraph 7 of the Official Journal < 
http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/ESRB-ECB-en.pdf?8ac74a965da0ec649984594b1b406ad4>
provided.35 In  confirming  the ESRB’s  role in  respect of  matters  relating  to financial  stability, 
paragraph  9  also  re iterates  the ECB’s  responsibility  in  engaging  national  central  banks  and 
supervisors to provide their specific expertise. The ECB  is also entrusted with functions aimed at 
providing analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical support to the ESRB.
Involvement of Micro Prudential Supervisors and Member of the Commission in the work of 
ESRB.
Paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Regulation (EU) No 1092/201036 respectively attribute the roles of micro 
prudential supervisors and a member of the Commission as being vital to ensuring that the assessment 
of macro prudential risk is based on complete and accurate information about the developments in the 
financial system, as well as establishing a link with the macro economic and financial surveillance of 
the Union. The presence of the President of the EFC is also considered important in “reflecting the 
role of  Member States’ ministries responsible for finance”, as well  as that of  the Council  “in 
safeguarding financial stability and performing economic and financial oversight”.
Functions of the European Systemic Risk Board
In order to facilitate the attainment of the objective of effective macro prudential oversight of the 
financial  system within  the European Union, the establishment of  “arrangements  that properly 
acknowledge the interdependence of micro and macro prudential risks”37 –  and having regard to the 
fact that “ the participation of micro prudential supervisors in the work of the European Systemic Risk 
Board is essential to ensure that the assessment of macro prudential risk is based on complete and 
accurate information about developments in the financial system,”38 the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) is designated with the following functions :39
35
3
 See paragraph 8; ibid
36
 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
on European Union Macro Prudential Oversight of the Financial System and Establishing a European Systemic 
Risk Board. See page 4 of 11 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0001:0011:EN:PDF>
37
 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010;  L 331/1 15.12.2010, Official Journal of the European Union 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0001:0011:EN:PDF> at page 4 of 11
38
 Ibid; paragraph 24
- Determining and/or collecting and analyzing all the relevant and necessary information for the 
purposes of achieving the objectives under paragraph 1, Article 3;
- Identifying and prioritizing systemic risks;
- Issuing  warnings  where such  systemic  risks  are deemed to be significant and, where 
appropriate, making these warnings public;
- Issuing recommendations for remedial action in response to the risks identified and, where 
appropriate, making these recommendations public;
- Issuing a confidential warning addressed to the Council and providing the Council with an 
assessment of the situation;40
- Monitoring the follow up to warnings and recommendations;
- Cooperating closely with all the other parties to the ESFS 41 where appropriate, providing the 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) with information on systemic risks required for the 
performance of their tasks –  and in particular, in collaboration with the ESAs, developing a 
common set of quantitative and qualitative indicators to identify and measure systemic risk;
39
3
 The ESRB is to carry out these tasks for the purposes of paragraph 1 of the same Article (Article 3) 
which states that “ESRB shall be responsible for the macro prudential oversight of the financial system within 
the Union in order to contribute to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks.” Further, the ESRB is also to 
contribute to “the smooth functioning of the Internal Market.”  See Chapter One, Article 3 which states the 
mission, objectives, and tasks of the ESRB (paragraphs 1 and 2). Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010;  L 331/1 
15.12.2010, Official Journal of the European Union <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0001:0011:EN:PDF> at page 5  of 11
40
4
 „In order to enable the Council to assess the need to adopt a decision addressed to the ESAs 
determining the existence of an emergency situation” 
41
 The ESFS comprise: 
(a) the ESRB;
(b) the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) established by Regulation (EU) 
No 1093/2010;
(c) the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) 
established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010;
(d) the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) established by 
Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010;
(e) the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (Joint Committee) provided for by 
Article 54 of  Regulation (EU)  No 1093/2010, of Regulation (EU)  No 1094/2010 and of  Regulation (EU) 
No 1095/2010;
(f) the competent or supervisory authorities in the Member States as specified in the Union acts referred to in 
Article 1(2)  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 1093/2010,  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 1094/2010  and  of  Regulation  (EU) 
No 1095/2010.”  See Chapter One Article One paragraph 3.
- Participating, where appropriate, in the Joint Committee;
- Coordinating its actions with those of international financial organizations, particularly the 
IMF and FSB;
- Carrying out other related tasks as specified in Union legislation.
F. Shadow Banking
Further concerns attributed to the new Basel III  framework relate to its “facilitation of the shadow 
banking system whilst constraining the bank sector.”42 The new, more stringent capital and liquidity 
requirements introduced through Basel III  are likely to impact the more highly regulated banking 
sector since it is likely that there will be greater incentives to transact in less stringent regulated sectors 
such as the shadow banking system or through less stringent regulated capital instruments.
The “shadow banking system” can generally be described as “credit intermediation involving entities 
and activities  outside the regular  banking  system.”43 The shadow banking  system can also  be 
interpreted as “a system which reallocates the three44 functions of banks across a variety of specialist, 
non bank financial intermediaries, each of which has a distinctive comparative advantage.”45
Some examples of shadow banks include finance companies, structured investment vehicles, asset 
backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, limited-purpose finance companies, credit hedge funds, 
money market mutual funds, securities lenders, and government sponsored enterprises.46 Hybrid 
42
4
 See BRIEF, „Deutsche Bank CFO Says Concerned New Basel Rules Allow Shadow Banking System 
Whilst  Constraining  Bank  Sector“  <  http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2011-05/20264700-brief-
deutsche-bank-cfo-says-concerned-new-basel-rules-allow-shadow-banking-system-020.htm
43
 Financial Stability Board, „Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues (A Background Note of the Financial 
Stability Board) http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110412a.pdf at page 3 of 11
44
 Such three functions of credit intermediation being referred to as credit, maturity and liquidity 
transformation. See Pozsar et al, “Shadow Banking” Staff Report No 458, July 2010 < 
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf> at page 18
45
 See ibid at page 19; Shadow banks are also defined as „financial intermediaries that conduct maturity, 
credit and liquidity transformation without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees.“See 
ibid at page 11. 
46
 See abstract; ibid. “As well as activities which appear to have a restricted purpose other than regulatory 
capital arbitrage, shadow banking also includes activities which appear to have significant economic value 
capital instruments, a component of shadow banking, play an important role in the ongoing capital 
management of  credit institutions  –  such  instruments  enabling  credit institutions  to achieve a 
diversified capital structure as well as providing access to a wide range of financial investors.  47 
However, as it will be demonstrated later on, such instruments also provide opportunities for practices 
associated with regulatory arbitrage. 
Shadow banking can be classified into three distinct subsystems namely:48
- Government sponsored shadow banking
- The internal banking shadow sub system
- The external banking shadow sub system
Similarities between Shadow Banking and Traditional Banking49 
1) Three actors feature prominently within the traditional banking and shadow banking systems. 
Whilst savers and borrowers are common to both banking systems, specialist non bank 
financial intermediaries (or shadow banks) feature within the shadow banking system –  in 
contrast to banks (which feature as the third actor in traditional banking systems).
2) Just as is  the case with traditional banking, the shadow banking system conducts credit 
intermediation.
outside the traditional banking system.” See ibid at page 12 
47
4
 See paragraph 3 of the Preamble to the Directive 2009/111/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 September 2009 (amending Directives 2006/48/EC; 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks 
affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis 
management).
48
 See Pozsar et al, “Shadow Banking” Staff Report No 458, July 2010 < 
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf> at page 20
49
 See ibid at page 11
Shadow Banking distinguished from Traditional Banking
In distinguishing between the traditional and shadow banking systems, two characteristics will be 
highlighted –  both relating to the similarities highlighted above. Whilst savers place their funds with 
banks under the traditional banking system, savers under the shadow banking system do not place their 
funds with banks - but rather with money market mutual funds and similar funds which invest these 
funds in the liabilities of shadow banks.50
Furthermore, unlike the situation which exists with traditional banking –  where credit intermediation is 
performed “under one roof” –  that of a bank, credit intermediation under shadow banking is performed 
“through a chain of non bank financial intermediaries and through a granular set of steps.”
Advantages and Disadvantages of Shadow Banking
An advantage of intermediating credit through non bank channels is the ability of the shadow banking 
system to provide market participants and corporations with an alternative source of funding and 
liquidity.51
However,  shadow banking  also  provides  opportunities  whereby  channels  facilitating  regulatory 
arbitrage (as well as practices undermining the observance of strict bank regulations) are encouraged. 
Three identified channels of arbitrage include:52
i) Cross-border regulatory systems arbitrage
ii) Regulatory, tax and economic capital arbitrage
iii) Ratings arbitrage
50
5
 „Borrowers still get loans, leases and mortgages –  not only from depository institutions, but also from 
entities such as finance companies.“; In relation to the second distinguishing feature between traditional banking 
and shadow banking, the “granular set of steps” through which credit intermediation under shadow banking is 
carried out include i) Loan origination ii)Loan warehousing iii) ABS(Asset backed securities) issuance iv) ABS  
warehousing  v)  ABS  CDO  (Collateralized debt obligations)  issuance vi)  ABS  “intermediation” and vii) 
wholesale funding; see ibid.
51
 See Financial Stability Board, „Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues (A Background Note of the 
Financial Stability Board) http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110412a.pdf at page 3 of 11
52
  See Pozsar et al, “Shadow Banking” Staff Report No 458, July 2010 < 
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf> at page 29
These arbitrage opportunities, it is  argued,53 emerged from i)  The fractured nature of the global 
financial regulatory framework ii)  the dependence of capital adequacy rules (Basel II)  on credit 
ratings; and iii) a collection of one-off uncoordinated decisions by accounting and regulatory bodies 
regarding the accounting and regulatory capital treatment of certain exposures and lending and asset 
management activities.
The original 1988 Basel Accord is also widely acknowledged to have contributed to capital arbitrage. 
In particular, capital arbitrage was is a primary reason why Basel II  was introduced. Basel II  was 
introduced as a means of providing for a choice54 of three broad approaches to credit risk.
In dedicating the focus on capital arbitrage, reference is made to the potential of the shadow banking 
system to trigger systemic risks through the provision of credit, maturity and liquidity transformations 
–  a situation which could arise where parts of the shadow banking system are able to function without 
“internalizing the true costs of its risks –  hence gaining a funding advantage relative to banks where 
regulation aims to achieve such an internalization –  which is likely to create opportunities for arbitrage 
that might undermine bank regulation and lead to a build up of additional leverage and risks in the 
system.”55 
Whereby maturity transformation involves the transformation of short term liabilities into medium-
long term assets (such as loans), liquidity transformation involves the financing of illiquid assets 
through liquid liabilities.
53
5
 See ibid
54
 The Standardised Approach to Credit Risk was introduced as a means of “aligning regulatory capital 
requirements more closely with the key elements of banking risk by introducing a wider differentiation of risk 
weights and a wider recognition of credit risk mitigation techniques, while avoiding excessive complexity.” It 
was intended that the approach would generate capital ratios more in line with the actual economic risks that 
banks are facing, compared to the original 1988 Basel Capital Accord –  which should “improve the incentives 
for banks to enhance the risk measurement and management capabilities and should also reduce the incentives 
for regulatory capital arbitrage”. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Consultative Document, The 
Internal Ratings Based Approach: Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord” January 2001, Bank 
for International Settlements Publications  at page 1 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf>
55
 “The provision of maturity/liquidity transformation and leverage could make credit intermediation by 
non bank entities “bank-alike” and raise concerns for authorities to the extent that they create systemic risks. See 
Financial Stability Board, „Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues (A Background Note of the Financial Stability 
Board) http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110412a.pdf at page 3 (page 5 of 11)
G. Efforts Aimed at Addressing Regulatory Arbitrage
The rapid growth of OTC derivative markets whose operations are carried out on a cross border basis 
–  such operations including transactions carried out for the purposes of “hedging, investing, exploiting 
arbitrage opportunities and position-taking”56 amongst other activities, not only calls for greater efforts 
aimed at fostering international cooperation and coordination, but also efforts aimed at deterring 
regulatory arbitrage practices –  hence mitigating the potential for the build up of systemic risks.
The following recommendations have been put forward as means of minimizing regulatory arbitrage –  
with the ultimate objective of mitigating systemic risk:57
- The need for authorities to implement mandatory clearing requirements in a manner conducive 
to the goal of systemic risk reduction –  with limited exemptions being granted when possible. 
Such limited exemptions being granted with the view that the non subjection of a product to 
mandatory requirements could create potential for regulatory arbitrage.58
- IOSCO , in collaboration with other authorities as appropriate, is to coordinate the application 
of central clearing requirements on a product and participant level –  as well as any exemptions 
from these.
- The prevention of the outsourcing of derivative operations into smaller financial entities 
would be facilitated by requiring all financial institutions to comply with mandatory clearing 
requirements –  hence reducing possibilities for regulatory arbitrage within the financial sector.
- Where central counterparties compete with each other or operate in multiple jurisdictions, 
consistent standards of oversight of such central counterparties are not only important as 
means of preventing such counterparties from attempting to attract clearing volume (through 
the lowering of margining or other risk management requirements), but also important as a 
means of preventing regulatory arbitrage.
- Differences in the definitions and regulation of exchanges and electronic trading platforms 
(which exist across jurisdictions and provide a range of trading fora), whilst being aimed at 
56
5
 See Financial Stability Board, „Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms“ October 2010 at page 
9
57
 See ibid at pages 26,27, 30 and 40
58
 This being the case since „market participants may design contracts so that they fit the terms of a 
product that does not require clearing. As a result, authorities will need to actively monitor whether such contract 
designs are occurring on a material scale.”
addressing  different types  of  participant trading  needs,  may  provide  the potential  for 
regulatory arbitrage practices.
Where a jurisdiction or authority decides to exempt non financial entities from applying mandatory 
clearing  requirements,  the importance  of  such  a  jurisdiction  or  authority  ensuring  that such 
exemptions, “either on a collective or individual firm basis, do not present systemic risk or undermine 
the benefits of CCP clearing for the market”, is also re-iterated. This being the case particularly, since 
as rightly argued, the application of mandatory clearing requirements to the largest financial firms may 
prove futile since “positions of small firms in the OTC derivatives markets may be significant. While 
the default of a large financial firm is likely to have a systemic impact, experience suggests that the 
degree of interconnectedness is also an important determinant of systemic relevance. Thus authorities 
will need to actively monitor OTC derivatives market activities to determine whether the activity of 
exempt entities is of a scale that could present systemic risk.”59
H. Conclusion
A harmonized set of standards, particularly at macro prudential level, is essential to the facilitation of 
coordination, as well as the aim of achieving the objectives of mitigating systemic risks, regulatory 
arbitrage practices and facilitating the vital roles of supervisors (and particularly those of crucial 
players such as central banks).
However, harmonized standards  should apply  as benchmarks  which should not be significantly 
deviated from where the need for such deviation arises and is justified –  given the individual and 
exceptional circumstances of those seeking such a deviation.
Coordination which is aimed at achieving prompt and timely communication is a vital goal which the 
refined macro prudential frameworks should endeavour to attain. In order to achieve such an aim, 
central banks’ expertise and the vital roles they assume will be required in facilitating the objectives of 
mitigating systemic risks, effective coordination and communication, as well as the mitigation of 
regulatory arbitrage. Further, the mitigation of systemic risks through the redress of shadow banking 
channels which could facilitate regulatory arbitrage practices, as well as the efficient functioning of 
new macro prudential frameworks will help ensure that new Basel III standards’ objectives to facilitate 
greater financial stability on a macro prudential basis are not undermined by possibilities and gaps 
which could foster capital arbitrage and the building up of systemic risks.
59
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 See ibid at pages 27 and 28. “Furthermore, if a jurisdiction chooses to exempt such participants from 
mandatory clearing requirements, international coordination, as well as the ongoing need to monitor whether the 
grounds on which a participant has been exempted continue to apply, will be critical to reducing the scope for 
regulatory arbitrage.” See ibid at page 28
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